The rise in executive compensation has triggered a great amount of public controversy and academic research. Critics have referred to the salaries paid to managers as "pay without performance", while defenders have countered that the large salaries can be explained by a "war for talents". This research tests whether a war for talent provides an explanation. The rise in executive compensation in recent years is explained by the assumption that, over the past decades, general managerial skills have become more important relative to firm-specific knowledge for the production of managers. A shift toward transferable managerial skills requires higher compensation, particularly in large firms, to attract and retain managerial talents. Relying on an internationalized and deregulated managerial labor market, i.e. the Swiss banking sector, the empirical findings confirm that a shift toward transferable managerial skills in large firms is indeed an explanation for the rise in executive compensation. However, the shift towards transferable managerial skills in large firms does not improve firm performance, giving no supporting evidence for a war for talent. It is discussed how transferable managerial skills may used to legitimize higher compensation at the top, e.g. by promulgating definitions of talent in elite labour markets.
Introduction
The compensation of top managers has attracted the attention of scientists for many years, in particular of economists and organizational theorists. Since the 1990s, executive compensation has dramatically increased worldwide . From 1992 to 2002, the average CEO pay in US S&P 500 firms rose by a factor of 3.5 . From 1995 to 2007 the average executive pay in German DAX30 firms stepped up by a factor of 4.6 . From 2002 to 2006, the average executive pay in Swiss SMI and SPI firms increased by a factor of 2.1. The rise in executive compensation has triggered a large amount of public controversy and academic research.
Critics have referred to the salaries paid to managers as "pay without performance" , while defenders have countered that the large salaries can be explained by a war for talents .
Defenders of the high salaries rest on the efficient labor market view. The rise in executive compensation in recent years is explained by the assumption that, over the past decades, general managerial skills have become more important relative to firm-specific knowledge.
Internationalization, deregulation and worldwide competition increase the outside options of managers who have acquired skills which are transferable across firms and industries . The "war for talents" requires higher compensation, particularly in large firms, to attract and retain managerial talents . Former empirical investigations centered on firm characteristics, such as firm size, profitability, growth, R&D expenditures, ownership structure, inside or outside directors, etc., to measure competition in the managerial labor market. However, such evidence is largely indirect because managerial talent itself is not measured. For example, the high correlation between executive compensation and firm size can not only be explained by the attraction of highly talented managers in large firms , but also by management entrenchment in large firms .
This article adds to the executive compensation literature by empirically testing whether a "war for talent" explains the rise in executive compensation. It takes theoretical models of the efficient labor market view as the basis. According to these models, the rise in executive compensation is the product of a shift toward transferable managerial skills, in particular in larger firms. This greater focus on transferable skills, especially in large firms, increases the production of managers . For an empirical test, we measure transferable managerial skills in an internationalized and deregulated managerial labor market, i.e. the Swiss banking sector. It is first tested whether the increase of executive compensation from 2004 to 2008 in listed Swiss banks can be explained by higher outside options due to transferable managerial skills in larger firms. Secondly, it is tested whether higher outside options due to transferable managerial skills in larger firms contribute to actual firm performance.
The article is structured as follows. The next section presents the theoretical model of the managerial efficient labor market view, with former empirical evidence, and develops hypotheses. The succeeding sections present methods, findings, and discussion.
The Efficient Labor Market View
Executive compensation research began in the early 1980s. It paralleled on the one hand the emergence of worldwide economic changes, i.e. the increasing internationalization and deregulation of markets, and on the other hand the general acceptance of agency theory . The literature explains the rise of executive compensation by referring to worldwide economic changes. While authors of the entrenchment view argue that agency problems increase in worldwide, deregulated markets due to a lack of control by the shareholders , authors of the efficient labor market view base their arguments on the assumption that agency problems between owners and managers are solved in worldwide, deregulated markets due to competition . In the following section, the theoretical model of the efficient labor market view is presented.
Theoretical model
The most prominent theoretical explanations for competition in the managerial labor market are developed by Murphy and Zábojník , and by Gabaix and Landier . Both models start from a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay where CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. Since talent has the greatest effect in bigger firms, in market equilibrium, the most skilled CEOs are employed by the largest companies.
The next section gives a short introduction of the market model of Murphy and Zabojnik . It explains the rise in executive compensation in recent years by assuming that over the past decades, general managerial skills have become more important relative to firm-specific knowledge. General skills are valuable across firms and industries and are therefore "priced" into the managerial labor market, whereas firm-specific knowledge is not transferable, and thus "unpriced". The model assumes that large firms strongly rely on general, transferable skills, since such managerial talent contributes to firm profitability.
The model assumes that firms consist of workers and one executive, and that they produce output by combining labor with the executives' managerial ability a. A firm employing n workers produces f(n)sa units of output, where s is the amount of the executive's firm-specific knowledge and a the amount of the executive's managerial ability. If the executive is promoted internally, then s= 1. If the firm hires an external candidate, then s= y<1. Further, the profit of a firm with n workers is a function of the market wage for workers w, the executive's ability a and his/her market wage w M (a).
If there exists a free entry of firms at any size, the equilibrium wage of an executive of ability a is determined by the best match for his/her ability at a firm of size n * (a) and his/her outside options, since each manager can choose to work in a non-managerial position at wage w. 
For a given level of firm specific knowledge y, the model implies that executives with an ability a lower than a and all workers earn wage w, while managers with an ability equal or higher than a earn * * ) ( ) ( wn ya n f a − = ψ .
Suppose now that a firm has an executive vacancy. The profit function ) ( ) ( , , a w wn sa n f s a n M − − = ) ( π indicates that the firm faces a make or buy trade-off: the firm can promote an internal candidate and preserve firm-specific managerial knowledge s.
Alternatively, the firm can hire from the outside market for managers and pick the best candidate for its size with the ability a * . The optimal promotion strategy of a firm whose internal candidate has ability a is to promote this candidate if the firm's profit is
A firm does not promote its internal candidate if an outside executive is the best match for the firm's perfect fit, that is a * > a . The fact that the firm's profit gross of the manager's wages, The basic premise of the market model is that, over the past decades, general managerial skills have become more important relative to firm-specific knowledge. As illustrated in Figure 1 , the shift over the past decades increases the amount of general managerial skills from some y L to some y H >y L . The increase in y increases the absolute and relative executive market wage. In Figure 1 , this is represented as an upward shift in the executive wage curve from
. Underlying this is the idea that competition for the most talented managers is becoming more intense, i.e. transferable skills are well priced in the managerial labor market, while firm-specific skills are underpriced.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Former empirical findings
Former empirical investigations centered on firm characteristics, such as firm size, profitability, growth, R&D expenditures, ownership structure, inside or outside directors, etc., to measure competition in the managerial labor market. For example, Murphy and Zábojník show that, over the last thirty years, the proportion of outside CEOs has doubled, the average job tenure of CEOs has substantially declined, and the pay premium of outside CEOs has almost quadrupled. The authors take this as empirical evidence for the market model. From the entrenchment point of view, the listed trends could just as well indicate control failure.
Since managerial ability is not directly measured, the findings could also imply that managers jump from one company to another and negotiate higher compensation, but are not creating 1 When the firm's profit from internal promotion is negative, 0 1 , , < ) ( a n π , while no outside executive is a better match for the firm's perfect fit, a * < a , the firm's profit maximizing strategy is to exit the market.
shareholder wealth. "In general, the best-paid baseball players are also the most skilled. The main question is: Is the CEO labor market working in the same way? Do you make more money if you are better at it? ..." .
Criticism can be also made with respect to other studies empirically testing the efficient labor market view. For example, it has been shown that firm size explains many of the patterns in CEO pay -across firms, over time, and between countries . While labor market research views this as evidence that CEO talent justifies large pay differences , entrenchment-oriented research views this as evidence that CEO power has a great impact on pay . Other studies aim to support the efficient labor market view by showing that an increase in international trade raises CEO pay . It is argued that globalization has led to foreign firms entering the war for managerial talent, which in turn has put upward pressure on pay. However, in the literature, globalization is also used to measure justifications of higher pays at the top, supporting the entrenchment view . Other papers examine the effect of deregulating the market for corporate control on CEO turnover and pay . While higher CEO turnover and pay is interpreted as evidence for the efficient labor market view, it could also be interpreted as evidence of greater agency problems in deregulated markets. Authors have also used the visibility of CEOs in the financial press to measure talent . Yet, in the executive literature press, visibility is also applied to measure CEO hubris or CEO manipulations to influence compensation .
Finally, former empirical research on the managerial labor market can be further criticized due to sample characteristics. First, most studies solely focus on CEOs and thus reduce managerial competition to persons already at the top rung of the hierarchical ladder. It is assumed that they are better than those who are not CEOs . A reference group ensuring sufficient variance in managerial talent is missing. Second, most samples comprise firms of many industries, thus lumping the demanded talent in different managerial labor markets together . Even though it is assumed that transferable skills across firms are becoming more important, it is still questionable how many skills are indeed transferable across different industries .
Hypotheses
In the following, we contribute to the empirical investigations of the efficient labor market view by deducing stepwise hypotheses to test this view. We follow the theoretical model of In accordance with the efficient labor market view, the following hypothesis will be tested.
Hypothesis 1.
Higher transferable skills of managers go along with higher outside options of managers as reflected in shorter job tenure.
2 The use of survival rates is a common approach in labor market research to measure outside options . Shorter probabilities of job tenure arise due to two facts. First, a manager is in demand by many firms . This aspect increases the demand-side risks for the present employer of the manager. Second, a manager competes with other managers . This aspect increases the supply-side risks of the manager. In contrast, in the entrenchment view, longer tenures are an indication of managerial power .
3 Labor markets can be divided into internal markets, where promotions and wages are determined internally, and external markets, where hires and wages are determined externally . 4 Other authors, however, find no evidence that the amount of outside hires is increasing since the 1990s . Other studies show that executive turnover is related to firm performance . There is also evidence that, for executives leaving their employers to accept high-level positions elsewhere, the average market reaction to the job change is negative for the firms the executives leave and positive for the firms they join . Other studies do consider the effect of firm size and measure transferable skills of managers directly. While some findings show that large firms perform better because they select their managers by transferable skills and pay higher compensation , other studies find no evidence that the greater focus on transferable skills in large firms improves performance . In line with the managerial efficient labor market view,
the following hypothesis will be tested.
Hypothesis 5. Increasing firm size goes along with higher outside options of managers due to transferable skills and thus increases firm performance. The former indices compare the transferable human capital of TMT members with all labor market peers. Typically, outside options are also dependent on social comparison processes with firm peers . For each TMT member, we additionally calculated his/her differences in transferable human capital compared to his/her direct competitors within a firm. We define direct competitors as all persons who entered the board from outside, i.e. newcomers at a time when the TMT member was already an insider and still employed. The definition considers that, for managers, the external labor market has a greater impact on managerial competition, i.e. the abilities of insiders are compared with the abilities of persons hired from outside. International experience. National experience refers to the stock of competences and knowledge embodied in the ability to understand the cultural characteristics of one market so as to produce economic value. It is the attribute gained by a worker through living and working in a national culture. In line with this definition, national experience is measured using the nationality of each TMT member. In contrast, international experience is the attribute gained by a worker through living and working in many national cultures. It is a fungible resource because it has value in many marketplaces. The increasing involvement of enterprises in international markets typically demands persons who understand international markets, i.e. domestic firms increasingly substitute national managers with foreign managers .
Foreign managers in domestic firms have accumulated transferable international experience because they combine the knowledge of their home market with knowledge of the new foreign market.
We dichotomized the data, indicating whether a TMT member has a national background (1=Swiss) or an international background (0=foreigner).
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The majority, i.e. 86% of the 627 persons, has a national background. We further measure the international experience of a TMT member compared with his/her direct competitors. For national TMT members, we measure the percentage of newcomers with a foreign background. For foreign TMT members,
we measure the percentage of newcomers with a national background. Control variables. We control for demographic characteristics. According to the theory of upper echelons, demographic characteristics have an impact on firm performance and may thus also influence outside options. For example, in recent years, the hunting for young talents has reduced the average age of top executives . We control for the age of persons by contrasting persons of the age peer groups 1925-40 (=1), and 1941-60 (=1) against persons of the age group 1961-and younger (=0). Women may be less in demand than men because they are relatively more averse to risk than men . We control for the gender of persons (0=female, 1=male). Persons with an economic background may be more in demand than persons with a non-economic background because the literature assumes that transferability of economic knowledge is higher (Murphy & Zábojník, 2007) . We control for the acquired economic knowledge of persons, measured by an economic education (=1). On the firm level, we further control for firm size, measured by the logarithms of total assets, and ownership type, measured by a variable indicating whether the bank is majority owned by the canton (=1) or not. Firm size. In former research, firm size has been operationalized by sales, number of employees, or total assets . According to the factor analysis of Tosi et al. , total assets are a good indicator of absolute firm size. We measured firm size using the log of each bank's total assets for each year. We tested whether alternative indicators of firm size predict equal results, which were confirmed by the robustness checks.
Measurements of the fixed-effect panel analysis
Firm performance. There exists within executive compensation literature no consensus about the proper measurement of firm performance . Finance research strongly supports the conclusion that shareholder wealth maximization should be the definitive criterion .
Organizational theorists argue that accounting-based indicators provide better measurements, since executives have a direct influence on them . Since both arguments are convincing, we consider both performance types . As an accounting-based performance measure, we selected the yearly earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). We include the yearly Tobin's q as a combined measurement of financial-and accounting-based performance. Tobin's q is defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of its assets . To measure financial based performance, we selected the yearly total shareholder return (TSR) and the market value of a company (MVC). This measurement can also be interpreted as a measurement of firm size. However, as we control for firm size, the remaining variance is an indication for financial performance .
Control variables. As we predict changes within a firm over time, we only consider time dummies as control variables. This procedure is in line with former executive compensation research .
Analysis
The data set of the survival analysis consists of 627 persons leading to 4997 observable person-years. We predict the survival probability of TMT members in firms by using Weibull regressions, which assume monotonic decreasing survival probabilities. We check the robustness of the results by additionally calculating log-logistic, log-normal and exponential regression models, which take as a basis slightly different probability distributions, e.g. bellshaped or shortly increasing and later decreasing probabilities.
The data set of the fixed-effect panel analysis includes information on 150 firm-years consisting of 2327 person-years. The data are grouped on the firm level, i.e. on the 30 banks.
The fixed-effect panel models predict within-firm-changes in TMT member compensation, and firm performance using within-regression estimators. work experience compared to all market peers (-.23***) and compared to their direct competitors (-.12**) have a significant lower survival probability in TMTs, indicating higher outside options. For example, after 10 years board tenure, TMT members with transferable human capital one standard deviation above the market average survive with a probability of 50%, whereas TMT members with transferable human capital one standard deviation below the market average survive with a probability of 85%. Similarly, after 10 years board tenure, TMT members with transferable human capital one standard deviation above their competitors survive with a probability of 60%, whereas TMT members with transferable human capital one standard deviation below their competitors survive with a probability of This finding is, however, in line with diversity research, which argues that, in particular, the demand for persons with diverse backgrounds is increasing (Knight et al., 1999) .
Results

Survival analysis
To sum up, the findings give support for Hypothesis 1. Higher transferable skills increase the outside options of managers.
Insert Table 1 about here TMT members of large firms have more outside options due to their higher amount of transferable skills.
Fixed-effect panel analysis
Insert Table 3 about here   Table 4 Table 4 also shows that more outside options of managers of large firms can only explain to some extent the huge effect of firm size on executive compensation. The main effect of firm size on compensation shows only weak changes, even though the models explicitly consider the link between outside options and firm size.
Insert Table 4 about here   Tables 5-8 test whether the greater outside options of TMT members of large firms are an indication for managerial talent. Hypothesis 5 assumes that more outside options in large firms increase firm performance. Even though the analysis considers four alternative performance measurements, the EBIT (Table 5) , the TobinsQ (Table 6) , total shareholder return (Table 7) , and the market value of the company (Table 8) , we find only a few significant effects. It is supported that, in large firms, the greater outside options of managers due to transferable human capital weakly increases EBIT (1.26 †; see Table 5 ) and Tobins Q (. 17 †; see Table 6 ). The higher outside options of managers of large firms due to their international or operational experiences have no effects on productivity. With respect to total shareholder returns, the opposite is obtained. In larger firms, higher outside options of managers due to transferable human (-.23*) and social capital (-.27 †) shrink shareholder returns (see Table 7 ). It suggests that shareholders of big companies profit more from the firm-specific investments of managers and not from transferable skills. We also tested whether the results in Tables 5-8 show no evidence (a) for a compensation of transferable skills independent of firm size and (b) for performance increases in large firms due to higher transferable managerial skills.
9 We additionally controlled whether ownership type, measured by the variable indicating whether the bank is majority owned by the canton or not, moderates the relationship between outside options of TMT members of large firms and firm performance. In banks not in majority owned by the canton firm-employee relationships may be weaker compared with cantonal banks reducing the importance of firm-specific investments on the part of the management . We find no significant relationships suggesting that the results are not moderated by ownership type.
Overall, the efficient labor market view is thus not supported by the data. On the one hand, the results show that transferable managerial skills increase executive compensation in large firms. In large firms, outside options arising due to transferable human capital, social capital, international experience, or operational experience are highly paid. On the other hand, while these outside options are valuable for managers of large firms, they are not for the company itself. The missing link on performance suggests that large firms are not selecting better managerial talent. The efficient labor market view, however, assumes that the selection strategy of large firms is caused by performance considerations, by the "war for talent". According to the entrenchment view these conditions are shirking and free-rider problems in large firms allowing to abuse power.
Limitations
This research did not measure the entrenchment view, but instead focused on the efficient labor market view. We are therefore not able to show whether the rise in executive compensation is explained by management entrenchment. In particular the missing evidence between outside options due to transferable managerial skills in large firms and firm performance can be caused by many facts and has to be investigated by future research.
Moreover, our measurements of transferable managerial skills can be criticized. In line with the efficient labor market view we emphasized the potential benefits of transferable managerial skills. One could however also argue that these measurements are direct indicators of managerial power because they quantify elite labour recruitment practices . A further development of validated measurements to capture firm-specific or transferable managerial skills would be helpful for empirical studies interested in these topics. 
Promotion for y H Promotion for y L
Source: Murphy and Zábojník . Figure 1 illustrates the effects of an increase in y on managerial wages and on promotion decision for a firm of size N. As y increase from yL to yH, the wage function shifts upward from w(a, yL ) to w(a, yH ) while the "promotion range" (aH,,aL,) shrinks. The left ego-network is rich in structural holes, i.e. the manager has a good broker position in his network because most of his/her direct contact can only reach each other through the manager, i.e. he/her cannot bypassed. The right ego-network includes no structural holes, i.e. the manager has no unique access or control because all persons of his/her network can reach each other directly, i.e. he/her can be bypassed.
Figure 5. TMT Member Compensation in Swiss Banks from 2004-2008
Legend: Pay figures document the yearly total compensation per TMT member comprising basic salary, variable pay including bonuses and long-term share plans, and other payments, e.g. contributions to pension schemes. .00 *** 61.63 .00 *** Legend: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10; Fixed-effect panel regression, N obs (N firms) 2287(30) R-sq (within) is taken from the Stata output of the fixed-effect panel regression. It is suggested to additionally compute the adj. R-squared by using a linear regression with a large dummy-variable set (areg command). For fixed-effect panel regressions least biased is however the F-value. Legend: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10; Fixed-effect panel regression, N obs (N firms) 2287(30) R-sq (within) is taken from the Stata output of the fixed-effect panel regression. It is suggested to additionally compute the adj. R-squared by using a linear regression with a large dummy-variable set (areg command). For fixed-effect panel regressions least biased is however the F-value. Legend: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10; Fixed-effect panel regression, N obs (N firms) 2287(30) R-sq (within) is taken from the Stata output of the fixed-effect panel regression. It is suggested to additionally compute the adj. R-squared by using a linear regression with a large dummy-variable set (areg command). For fixed-effect panel regressions least biased is however the F-value. Legend: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10; Fixed-effect panel regression, N obs (N firms) 2287(30) R-sq (within) is taken from the Stata output of the fixed-effect panel regression. It is suggested to additionally compute the adj. R-squared by using a linear regression with a large dummy-variable set (areg command). For fixed-effect panel regressions least biased is however the F-value. Legend: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10; Fixed-effect panel regression, N obs (N firms) 2287(30 R-sq (within) is taken from the Stata output of the fixed-effect panel regression. It is suggested to additionally compute the adj. R-squared by using a linear regression with a large dummy-variable set (areg command). For fixed-effect panel regressions least biased is however the F-value. 
